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Abstract
In an Ideal Shortest Path Algorithm (ISPA), at each moment each router in a
network sends all of its traffic down the path that will incur the lowest cost to that
traffic. In the limit of an infinitesimally small amount of traffic for a particular
router, its routing that traffic via an ISPA is optimal, as far as cost incurred by
that traffic is concerned. We demonstrate though that in many cases, due to the
side-effects of one router’s actions on another routers performance, having routers
use ISPA’s is suboptimal as far as global aggregate cost is concerned, even when only
used to route infinitesimally small amounts of traffic. As a particular example of this
we present an instance of Braess’ paradox for ISPA’s, in which adding new links to
a network decreases overall throughput. We also demonstrate that load-balancing,
in which the routing decisions are made to optimize the global cost incurred by all
traffic currently being routed, is suboptimal as far as global cost averaged across
time is concerned. This is also due to “side-effects”, in this case of current routing
decision on future traffic. The theory of COllective INtelligence (COIN) is concerned
precisely with the issue of avoiding such deleterious side-effects. We present key
concepts from that theory and use them to derive an idealized algorithm whose
performance is better than that of the ISPA, even in the infinitesimal limit. We
present experiments verifying this, and also showing that a machine-learning-based
version of this COIN algorithm in which costs are only imprecisely estimated (a
version potentially applicable in the real world) also outperforms the ISPA, despite
having access to less information than does the ISPA. In particular, this COIN
algorithm avoids Braess’ paradox.
1 INTRODUCTION
The problem of how to control routing across a network underlies a vast array of real-
world problems including internet routing, voice/video communication, traffic flows, etc.
In its general form, the problem is how to optimize the flow of certain entities (e.g.,
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information packets, cars) from sources to destinations across a network of routing nodes.
Here we are concerned with the version of the problem in which “optimization” consists
of minimizing aggregate cost incurred by the entities flowing to their destinations. To
ground the discussion, we will consider the case where the entities being routed are
packets.
Currently, many real-world network routing solutions to this particular problem are
based on the Shortest Path Algorithm (SPA), in which each routing node in the network
maintains estimates of the “shortest paths” (i.e., minimal total incurred costs) from it
to each of its destinations and at each moment satisfies any routing requests by sending
all its packets down that shortest path. Many algorithms exist for efficiently computing
the shortest path in the case where the costs for traversing each component of every
path at any given time are known. In particular, there exist many such algorithms
that can be applied when node-to-node path-cost communication is available and the
costs for traversing each component are unvarying in time (e.g., Dijkstra’s Algorithm
[1, 3, 9, 10]. Real-world SPA’s apply such algorithms to estimated costs for traversing
each component of every path to generate their estimated shortest paths.
Consider the case where for all paths from a particular node to a particular destina-
tion, the costs that would be incurred by that node’s routing all its current traffic along
that path is known exactly to that node (the information being stored in that router’s
“routing table”). Clearly if a non-infinitesimal amount of traffic is being routed by our
node, then in general its sending all that traffic down a single path will not result in
minimal cost incurred by that traffic, no matter how that single path is chosen. However
if it must choose a single path for all its traffic, then tautologically the SPA chooses the
best such path. Accordingly, in the limit of routing an infinitesimally small amount of
traffic, with all other nodes’ strategies being a “background”, such a router’s running
SPA is the optimal (least aggregate incurred cost) routing strategy for that particular
routing node considered individually.
One might hope that more generally, if the node must allot all of its traffic to a single
path, then its choosing that path via the SPA would be the globally optimal choice
of a single path, at least in the limit of infinitesimally little traffic. This is not the
case though, because in using the SPA the node is not concerned with the deleterious
side-effects of its actions on the costs to other nodes [15, 26]. In the extreme case, as
elaborated below, if all nodes were to try to minimize their personal costs via SPA’s,
then the nodes would actually all receive higher cost than would be the case under an
alternative set of strategies. This is an instance of the famous Tragedy Of the Commons
(TOC) [12].
Deleterious side-effects need not be restricted to extend over space; they can also
extend over time. Indeed, consider the algorithm of having all routers at a given moment
make routing decisions that optimize global cost incurred by the traffic currently being
routed, an algorithm often called “load-balancing” (LB). By definition, LB avoids the
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deleterious side-effects over space that can result in the TOC for the costs incurred by the
traffic currently being routed. However, due to side-effects over time, even conventional
LB is often suboptimal as far as global cost averaged across time is concerned. Intuitively,
one would have to use “load-balancing over time” to ensure truly optimal performance.
In this paper we are concerned with how to address these kinds of deleterious side-
effects, and thereby improve performance. In particular, we are interested in ways of
doing this that result in better performance than that of the ubiquitous SPA.
Now use of the SPA obviously provides no guarantees, even for personal cost of the
router using it, if the path-estimates of the nodes are incorrect. Such inaccuracy is the
rule rather than the exception in many practical applications. Typically those estimates
will be in error because node-to-node communication is not instantaneous, and therefore
routing tables may be based on out of date information. More generally though, even if
that communication were instantaneous, the cost to traverse a component of the network
may be different by the time the packet arrives at that component.
In this paper we do not wish to investigate such topics, but rather to highlight the
issue of side-effects. Accordingly we “rig the game” in favor of the SPA by constructing
our simulations so that the first potential cause of routing table inaccuracy does not arise,
and the second is minimized. We do this in our experiments by using an Ideal Shortest
Path Algorithm (ISPA) which has direct access to the shortest path at each moment.
Note that this ISPA provides an upper bound on the performance of any real-world SPA.
In general, even without side-effects, determining the optimal solution to a flow prob-
lem (e.g., determining what the loads on each link need to be to maximize throughput
on a non-cooperative data network) can be nontractable [1, 20]. Therefore, we will con-
cern ourselves with providing good solutions that avoid the difficulties the ISPA has with
side-effects. It is not our aim here to present algorithms that find the best possible
(“load-balanced over time”) solution.
We will base our solutions on the concept of Collective Intelligence. A “COllec-
tive INtelligence” (COIN) is any pair of a large, distributed collection of interacting
goal-driven computational processes among which there is little to no centralized com-
munication or control, together with a ‘world utility’ function that rates the possible
dynamic histories of the collection [26, 25]. In this paper we are particularly concerned
with computational processes that use machine learning techniques (e.g., reinforcement
learning [14, 23, 22, 24]) to try to achieve their goal, conventionally represented as max-
imizing an associated utility function. We consider the central COIN design problem:
how, without any detailed modeling of the overall system, can one set utility functions for
the individual components in a COIN to have the overall dynamics reliably and robustly
achieve large values of the provided world utility? In other words, how can we leverage
an assumption that our learners are individually fairly good at what they do? In a
routing context, this question reduces to what goals one ought to provide to each router
so that each router’s greedily pursuing those goals will maximize throughput (“incentive
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engineering”). For reasons given above, we know that the answer to this question is not
provided by SPA’s goals — some new set of goals is needed.
In Section 2 we discuss the SPA’s deficiencies and in particular their manifestations
in Braess’ paradox. We also demonstrate the suboptimality of load-balancing in that
section. We then present Collective Intelligence in Section 3, discuss the routing model
we will use in our experiments, and show how the theory of COINs can be applied
to that model to provide an alternative to shortest path algorithms. In Section 4 we
present simulation results with that model that demonstrate that in networks running
ISPA, the per packet costs can be as much as 32 % higher than in networks running
algorithms based on COIN theory. In particular, even though it only has access to
imprecise estimates of costs (a handicap that does not hold for ISPA), the COIN-based
algorithm almost always avoids Braess’ paradox, in stark contrast to the ISPA. In that
the cost incurred with ISPA’s is presumably a lower bound on that of an SPA not privy
to instantaneous communication, the implication is that COINs can outperform such
real-world SPA’s.1
2 Suboptimality of Shortest Path and Load-Balancing
In this section we first demonstrate the suboptimality of an SPA when we have multiple
nodes making simultaneous routing decisions, where neither node knows ahead of time
the other’s choice, and therefore does not know ahead of time exactly what the costs will
be. We then demonstrate that such suboptimality can hold even when only one node is
making a decision, and it knows what decisions the others have previously made. Next we
present Braess’ paradox, a particularly pointed instance of these effects. (See [2, 7, 6, 18]
for other discussion of Braess’ paradox in SPA routing.) We end by demonstrating the
suboptimality of conventional load-balancing when cost over time is what’s of interest.
2.1 SPA when multiple routers are simultaneously making decisions
Perhaps the simplest example of how individual greed on the part of all nodes can lead
to their collective detriment occurs when two nodes determine that their shortest path
is through a shared link with a limited capacity, while both have a second option that
is slightly less preferable. In such a case, their using the common link degrades the
performance of both parties, since due to limited capacity the performance of that link
will quickly fall below that of their second option.
More precisely, consider the case where, given a load x, the shared link has a cost
given by x3, and where each router has a second option where the cost is given by 2x.
Acting alone, with a single packet to send, they would both send that packet through
1A brief synopsis of the COIN algorithm discussed here was presented in a space-constrained article
[26]; this paper presents full details and applies the algorithm to Braess’ paradox as an illustration of
the suboptimality of the SPA.
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the shared link (cost of 1). However by both doing so, they incur a larger cost (cost of 8)
than if they had both used their second choice (cost of 4). Without knowing what each
other will do ahead of time (information not conventionally contained in routing tables),
the nodes will necessarily have mistaken cost estimates and therefore make incorrect
routing decisions. (Indeed, to have all nodes know what each other are doing ahead of
time requires the use of game theory.) In this, even in the limit of differentially small
packets, use of SPA will lead to a wrong routing decision.
2.2 SPA when only one router is making a decision
Consider the network shown in Figure 1. Two source routers X and Y each send one
packet at a time, with X sending to either intermediate router A or B, and Y sending
to either B or C. This type of network may arise in many different topologies as a
subnetwork. Accordingly, difficulties associated with this network can also apply to
many more complex topologies.
②
X
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏❏
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡✡
②
Y
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏❏
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡✡
②
A
②
B
②
C
Figure 1: Independent decisions at the source
Let xA, xB , yB , and yC , be the packet quantities at a particular fixed time t, at A,
B, or C, and originating from X or Y , as indicated. At t, each source has one packet to
send. So each of our variables is binary, with xA+xB = yB+ yC = 1. Have Vi(zi) be the
cost, per packet, at the single instant t, at router i, when the total number of packets at
that instant on that router is zi. So the total cost incurred by all packets at the time t,
G(~x, ~y), equals xAVA(xA) + (xB + yB)VB(xB + yB) + (yC)VC(yC).
In an ISPA, X chooses which of xA or xB = 1 so as to minimize the cost incurred by
X’s packet alone, gX(~x) ≡ xAVA(xA) +xBVB(xB + yB). (Real-world SPA’s typically try
to approximate this by having X choose either A or B according to whether VA(0) or
VB(yB) is smaller, where those two values can be estimated via pings, for example.) In
doing this the ISPA ignores the yBVB(xB + yB) term, i.e., it ignores the “side effects” of
X’s decision.
The right thing to do of course is instead have X minimize G(~x, ~y), or more precisely,
the components of G(~x, ~y) that depend on X. Writing it out for this case, X ought to act
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to minimize xAVA(xA)+(xB+yB)VB(xB+yB). Due to the constraint that xA+xB = 1,
this means sending down A iff VA(1) < (yB + 1)VB(yB + 1) − yBVB(yB), which differs
from the ISPA result in that X is concerned with the full cost of going through router
B, not just the portion of that cost that its packet receives.
In the context of this example, thisG-minimizing algorithm constitutes “load-balancing”
(LB). Note that so long as sgn[VA(0)−VB(yB)−yBV
′
B(yB)] 6= sgn[VA(0)−VB(yB)], even
in the limit of infinitesimally small traffic (so that xA + xB equals some infinitesimal δ),
ISPA and LB still disagree.
2.3 Braess’ Paradox
Braess’ paradox [2, 7, 6, 16, 18] dramatically underscores the inefficiency of the ISPA
described above. This apparent “paradox” is perhaps best illustrated through a highway
traffic example first given by Bass [2]: There are two highways connecting towns S and
D. The cost associated with traversing either highway (either in terms of tolls, or delays)
is V1+V2, as illustrated in Net A of Figure 2. So when x = 1 (a single traveler) for either
path, total accrued cost is 61 units. If on the other hand, six travelers are split equally
among the two paths, they will each incur a cost of 83 units to get to their destinations.
Now, suppose a new highway is built connecting the two branches, as shown in Net
B in Figure 2. Further, note that the cost associated with taking this highway is not
particularly high (in fact for any load higher than 1, this highway has a lower cost than
any other highway in the system). The benefit of this highway is illustrated by the
dramatically reduced cost incurred by the single traveler: by taking the short-cut, one
traveler can traverse the network at a cost of 31 units (2 V1 + V3). Adding a new road
has seemingly reduced the traversal cost dramatically.
②S❜
❜
❜
❜
❜
✧
✧
✧
✧
✧
②V1 ②V2
②V2 ✧
✧
✧
✧
✧
②V1❜
❜
❜
❜
❜
②D
②S✧
✧
✧
✧
✧
❜
❜
❜
❜
❜
②V1 ②V2
②V2 ✧
✧
✧
✧
✧
②V1❜
❜
❜
❜
❜
②D
②
V3
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
Net A Net B
Figure 2: Hex network with V1 = 10x ; V2 = 50 + x ; V3 = 10 + x
However consider what happens when six travelers are on the highways in net B. If
each node uses an ISPA, then at equilibrium each of the three possible paths contains two
travelers.2 Due to overlaps in the paths however, this results in each traveler incurring
2We have in mind here the Nash equilibrium for this problem, where no traveler (or equivalently, no
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a cost of 92 units, which is higher than than what they incurred before the new highway
was built. The net effect of adding a new road is to increase the cost incurred by every
traveler. This phenomenon is known as Braess’ paradox.
2.4 The Suboptimality of Load-Balancing
As mentioned before, LB considers side-effects of current routing decisions on other traffic
currently being routed. However because it does not consider side-effects of routing
decisions on future traffic, even LB may not optimize global cost averaged across all
time, depending on the details of the system. Here we present an existence proof of this,
by explicitly constructing a situation where conventional LB is suboptimal.
Consider a system with discrete time, in which the node X under consideration must
route one packet to the (fixed) destination at each time step (cf. Section 2.2 above).
Presume further that no traffic enters any of the nodes X sends to except for X. (So
that traffic coming from X is the sole source of any costs associated with X’s outbound
links.) Let S(t) be the number of times our node sent a packet down some link A in
the W time steps preceding t, and take s(t) = A,B to mean that the router uses link A
or B, respectively, at time t. Model queue backups and the like by having the cost to
send a packet down link A at time t be CA(S(t)/W ), and have the cost for our router
to instead send the packet down link B be CB(1 − S(t)/W ), For simplicity we assume
that both CA(.) and CB(.) are monotonically increasing functions of their arguments.
Restrict attention to nodes that work by having s(t) = A iff S(t) ≤ k for some
real-valued threshold k. The LB algorithm will choose s(t) = A iff CA(S(t)/W ) ≤
CB(1 − S(t)/W ). So the LB algorithm’s behavior is indistinguishable from this kind
of threshold algorithm, with k set so that CA(k/W ) = CB(1 − k/W ). (We implicitly
assume that CA(.) and CB(.) are chosen so that such a solution exists for 1 < k < W−1.)
The question is what k should be to optimize total averaged cost across time, and in
particular if that k is the same as kLB , the k that LB uses.
Now as we go from one time step to the next, the routing decision made W time steps
ago drops out of the computation of S(t), while the routing decision just made is newly
included. In general, S(t+1) = S(t)+1 if the router just used A at time t and used link
B at the time W time steps into the past. On the other hand, S(t+1) = S(t)− 1 if the
router just used B and used A W time steps ago, while S(t + 1) = S(t) if the routing
decision just made is the same as the routing decision W time steps ago. So in general,
S(t) can only change by -1, 0, or +1 as we go from one time step to the next.
Consider cases where 1 < k < W − 1, so that eventually the router must choose
an A, and at some subsequent time t∗ the router switches from A to B. At that time
s(t∗ − 1) = A and s(t∗) = B. This implies that S(t∗ − 1) ≤ k, S(t∗) > k. Define the
value S(t∗ − 1) as k∗. Note that S(t∗) = k∗ + 1, and k − 1 < k∗ ≤ k.
router) can gain advantage by changing strategies.
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Now for any time t′, if S(t′) = k∗+1, s(t′+1) = B, and the only possible next values
are S(t′+1) = k∗ or S(t′+1) = k∗+1, depending on the old decision s(t−W ) that gets
dropped out of the window. Similarly, if S(t′) = k∗, s(t′+1) = A, and the only possible
next values are S(t′+1) = k∗ or S(t′+1) = k∗+1, again depending on the old decision
being dropped. So we see that once S(t′) ∈ {k∗, k∗ + 1}, it stays there forever.
This means that because of the relationship between k and k∗, in any interval of W
consecutive time steps subsequent to t∗, the number of packets sent along A by router X
must be ∈ (k− 1, k+1]. (Note that it is possible to send k+1 packets along A, but not
k− 1 packets. Therefore the number sent along B must be ∈ [W − (k+1),W − (k− 1)).
Each time that a packet is sent along A the cost incurred is the cost of link A with
average traffic level S(t)/W , CA(S(t)/W ). Similarly, each time the link B is chosen,
the cost incurred is CB(1 − S(t)/W ). Since S(t) ∈ {k
∗, k∗ + 1}, and both CA(.) and
CB(.) are monotonically increasing, the cost for sending the packet down link A ∈
(CA((k − 1)/W ), CA((k + 1)/W ], and that for sending it down link B is contained in
[CB(1− (k + 1)/W ), CB(1− (k − 1)/W )).
Now we know that the choice of A must have average frequency (across all time)
between k∗/W and (k∗ + 1)/W . Similarly, B will have average frequency between (1−
(k∗ + 1)/W ) and 1− k∗/W . Accordingly, the average cost is bounded above by
k∗ + 1
W
CA
(
k + 1
W
)
+
(
1−
k∗
W
)
CB
(
1−
k − 1
W
)
, (1)
where the first term provides the maximum possible average cost for using link A, while
the second term independently provides the maximum possible average cost for using
link B. (Note that the actual cost will be lower since the two frequencies in this bound,
one for A and one for B, cannot both have the values indicated.) Because k−1 < k∗ ≤ k
and since 1− k−1
W
= 1 + 2
W
− k+1
W
, our upper bound is itself bounded above by
k + 1
W
CA
(
k + 1
W
)
+
(
1 +
2
W
−
k + 1
W
)
CB
(
1 +
2
W
−
k + 1
W
)
. (2)
The optimal k will result in an average cost lower than the minimum over all k of the
upper bound on average cost, given in Equation 2. So the average cost for the optimal
k is bounded above by the minimum over k of this upper bound. Lable this argmin of
Equation 2 k’.
Since other values of k besides kLB result in behavior equivalent to LB, it does not
suffice to simply test if k’ = kLB . Instead let us evaluate some lower bounds in a similar
fashion to how we evaluated upper bounds. Using the average frequencies discussed
above, the average cost is bounded below by:
k∗
W
CA
(
k − 1
W
)
+
(
1−
1
W
−
k∗
W
)
CB
(
1−
k + 1
W
)
, (3)
where the first term provides the minimum possible average cost for using link A, while
the second term provides the minimum possible average cost for using link B. Again,
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because k − 1 < k∗ ≤ k, the term is Equation 3 is further bounded below by
k − 1
W
CA
(
k − 1
W
)
+
(
1−
2
W
−
k − 1
W
)
CB
(
1−
2
W
−
k − 1
W
)
. (4)
In particular this bound holds for the average cost of the LB algorithm:
kLB − 1
W
CA
(
kLB − 1
W
)
+
(
1−
2
W
−
kLB − 1
W
)
CB
(
1−
2
W
−
kLB − 1
W
)
, (5)
where as before kLB satisfies CA(kLB/W ) = CB(1− kLB/W ).
By appropriate choice of CA(.) and CB(.), we can ensure that the lower bound on
the cost with the LB algorithm (Equation 5 evaluated with k = kLB) is higher than
the upper bound on the average cost incurred by the optimal algorithm (the minimum
over k of Equation 2).3 That is, the best possible average cost achieve by load balancing
will be worse than the worst average cost that could arise through the optimal routing
strategy. This establishes that LB does not engage in optimal routing.
3 COIN-based Routing
One common solution to these types of side-effect problems is to have particular com-
ponents of the network (e.g., a “network manager” [17]) dictate certain choices to other
nodes. This solution can incur major brittleness and scaling problems however. Another
kind of approach, which avoids the problems of a centralized manager, is to provide the
nodes with extra incentives that can induce them to take actions that are undesirable to
them from a strict SPA sense. Such incentive can be in the form of “taxes” or “tolls”
added to the costs associated with traversing particular links to discourage the use of
those links. Such schemes in which tolls are superimposed on the nodes’ goals are a
special case of the more general approach of replacing the goal of each node with a new
goal. These new goals are specifically tailored so that if they are collectively met the
system maximizes throughput. A priori, a node’s goal need have no particular relation
with the SPA-type cost incurred by that node’s packets. Intuitively, in this approach,
we provide each node with a goal that is “aligned” with the global objective, with no
separate concern for of that goal’s relation to the SPA-type cost incurred by the traffic
routed by that node.
In this section, we first summarize the theory of such systems, which are called COl-
lective INtelligences (COIN’s) [27, 25]. We then use that theory to justify an algorithm
3For example, for CA(x) = x
2 and CB(x) = x, balancing the loads on A and B — setting
CA(S(t)/W ) = CB(1−S(t)/W ) — results in (S(t)/W )2 = 1−S(t)/W , leading to kLB/W =
√
5−1
2
= .618.
For W = 1000, the associated lower bound on average cost (Equation 5) is .617(.617)2 +(.998− .617)2 =
.380. On the other hand, with CA and CB given as above, Eq 2 is (
k+1
W
)3 + (1+ 2
W
− k+1
W
)2. Differenti-
ating with respect to k and setting the result to zero leads to k
′
W
= − 1
3
− 1
W
+
√
28+48/W
6
. For a window
size of W = 1000, this yields k′/W = .548, a different result than kLB . Plugging into Equation 2, the
upper bound on the performance with k’ is (.549)3 + (1.002 − .549)2 = .371, which is less than .380.
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that only uses limited knowledge of the state of the network (in particular knowledge
that is readily available to routers in common real data networks) to make routing de-
cisions. At each router, this algorithm uses a Memory Based (MB) machine learning
algorithm to estimate the value that a private utility (provided by COIN theory) would
take on under the different candidate routing decisions. It then makes routing decisions
aimed at maximizing that utility. (We call this algorithm an MB COIN.)
3.1 The COIN Formalism
In this paper we consider systems that consist of a set of nodes, connected in a network,
evolving across a set of discrete, consecutive time steps, t ∈ {0, 1, ...}. Without loss of
generality, we let all relevant characteristics of a node η at time t— including its internal
parameters at that time as well as its externally visible actions — be encapsulated by a
Euclidean vector ζ
η,t
with components ζ
η,t;i
. We call this the “state” of node η at time
t, and let ζ
,t
be the state of all nodes at time t, while ζ is the state of all node across all
time.
World utility, G(ζ), is a function of the state of all nodes across all time. (Note
that that state is a Euclidean vector.) When η is an agent that uses a machine learning
(ML) algorithm to “try to increase” its private utility, we write that private utility as
gη(ζ), or more generally, to allow that utility to vary in time, gη,τ (ζ).
We assume that ζ encompasses all physically relevant variables, so that the dynamics
of the system is deterministic (though of course imprecisely known to anyone trying
to control the system). Note that this means that all characteristics of an agent η at
t = 0 that affects the ensuing dynamics of the system must be included in ζ
η,0
. For
ML-based agents, this includes in particular the algorithmic specification of its private
utility, typically in the physical form of some computer code. (As elaborated in [25] the
mathematics can be generalized beyond ML-based agents.)
Here we focus on the case where our goal, as COIN designers, is to maximize world
utility through the proper selection of private utility functions. Intuitively, the idea is
to choose private utilities that are aligned with the world utility, and that also have the
property that it is relatively easy for us to configure each node so that the associated
private utility achieves a large value. In this paper, we restrict attention to utilities of
the form
∑
t≥τ Rt(ζ ,t) for reward functions Rt (simply
∑
tRt(ζ ,t) for non-time-varying
utilities). From now on, we will only consider world utilities whose associated set of {Rt}
are all time-translations of one another. In particular, as shown below, overall network
throughput is expressible this way.
We need a formal definition of the concept of having private utilities be “aligned”
with G. Constructing such a formalization is a subtle exercise. For example, consider
systems where the world utility is the sum of the private utilities of the individual nodes.
This might seem a reasonable candidate for an example of “aligned” utilities. However
such systems are examples of the more general class of systems that are “weakly trivial”.
10
It is well-known that in weakly trivial systems each individual agent greedily trying to
maximize its own utility can lead to the tragedy of the commons [12, 8] and actually
minimize G. In particular, this can be the case when private utilities are independent
of time and G =
∑
η gη. Evidently, at a minimum, having G =
∑
η gη is not sufficient to
ensure that we have “aligned” utilities; some alternative formalization of the concept is
needed.4
A more careful alternative formalization of the notion of aligned utilities is the concept
of “factored” systems. A system is factored at time τ when the following holds for each
agent η individually: A change at time τ to the state of η alone, when propagated across
time, will result in an increased value of gη,τ (ζ) if and only if it results in an increase for
G(ζ) [25].
For a factored system, the side-effects of a change to η’s t = τ state that increases
its private utility cannot decrease world utility. There are no restrictions though on the
effects of that change on the private utilities of other nodes and/or times. In particular,
we don’t preclude different a node’s algorithm at two different times from “working at
cross-purposes” to each other, so long as at both moments the node is working to improve
G. In game-theoretic terms, optimal global behavior corresponds to the agents’ reaching
a private utility Nash equilibrium for such systems [11]. In this sense, there can be no
TOC for a factored system. As a trivial example, a system is factored for gη,τ = G ∀η.
Define the effect set of the node-time pair (η, τ) at ζ, Ceff(η,τ)(ζ), as the set of all
components ζ
η′,t
which under the forward dynamics of the system have non-zero partial
derivative with respect to the state of node η at t = τ . Intuitively, (η, τ)’s effect set is
the set of all components ζ
η′,t≥τ
which would be affected by a change in the state of
node η at time τ . (They may or may not be affected by changes in the t = τ states of
the other nodes.)
Next, for any set σ of components (η′, t), define CLσ(ζ) as the “virtual” vector formed
by clamping the σ-components of ζ to an arbitrary fixed value. (In this paper, we take
that fixed value to be ~0 for all components listed in σ.) The value of the effect set
wonderful life utility (WLU for short) for σ is defined as:
WLUσ(ζ) ≡ G(ζ)−G(CLσ(ζ)). (6)
In particular, we are interested in the WLU for the effect set of node-time pair (η, τ).
This WLU is the difference between the actual world utility and the virtual world utility
where all node-time pairs that are affected by (η, τ) have been clamped to a zero state
while the rest of ζ is left unchanged.
Since we are clamping to ~0, we can view (η, τ)’s effect set WLU as analogous to the
change in world utility that would have arisen if (η, τ) “had never existed”. (Hence the
4Note that in the simple network discussed in Section 2.1, the utilities are weakly trivial, since
G(~x, ~y) = gX(~x) + gy(~y). This provides another perspective on the suboptimality of ISPA in that
network.
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name of this utility - cf. the Frank Capra movie.) Note however, that CL is a purely
“fictional”, counter-factual operator, in the sense that it produces a new ζ without taking
into account the system’s dynamics. The sequence of states the node-time pairs in σ are
clamped to in constructing the WLU need not be consistent with the dynamical laws
of the system. This dynamics-independence is a crucial strength of the WLU. It means
that to evaluate the WLU we do not try to infer how the system would have evolved if
node η’s state were set to ~0 at time τ and the system evolved from there. So long as we
know ζ extending over all time, and so long as we know G, we know the value of WLU.
Assuming our system is factored with respect to private utilities {gη,τ}, we want each
node to be in a state at time τ that induces as high a value of the associated private
utility as possible (given the initial states of the other nodes). Assume η is ML-based
and able to achieve fairly large values of most private utilities we are likely to set it for
time τ , i.e., assume that given that private utility gη,τ , the rest of the components of ζη,τ
are set by η’s algorithm in such a way so as to achieve a relatively high value of gη,τ . So
our problem becomes determining for what {gη,τ } the nodes will best be able to achieve
high gη (subject to each other’s actions) while also causing dynamics that is factored for
G and the {gη,τ}.
As mentioned above, regardless of the system dynamics, having gη,τ = G ∀η means
the system is factored at time τ . It is also true that regardless of the dynamics, gη,τ =
WLU
C
eff
(η,τ)
∀η is a factored system at time τ (proof in [25]). Which of these two choices
of the {gη,τ} should we use?
To answer this, note that since each agent is operating in a large system, it may
experience difficulty discerning the effects of its actions on G when G sensitively depends
on all the myriad components of the system. Therefore each η may have difficulty learning
from past experience what to do to achieve high gη,τ when gη,τ = G.
5
This problem can be mitigated by using effect set WLU as the private utility, since
the subtraction of the clamped term removes much of the “noise” of the activity of
other agents, leaving only the underlying “signal” of how the agent in question affects
the utility. (This reasoning is formalized as the concept of “learnability” in [25].)
Accordingly, one would expect that setting private utilities to WLU’s ought to result in
better performance than having gη,τ = G ∀η, τ . In practice, we will often only be able to
estimate the “primary”, most prominent portion of the effect set. However assuming that
the associated WLU is close enough to being factored, we would expect the advantage
in learnability with such a WLU to still result in better performance than would using
gη,τ = G ∀η, τ . (See [27, 25].) Indeed, for the sake of improving learnability, often
5In particular, in the routing problem, having private rewards given by the world reward functions
means that to provide each router with its reward at each time step we need to provide it the full
throughput of the entire network at that step. This is usually infeasible in practice. Even if it weren’t
though, using these private utilities would mean that the routers face a very difficult task in trying to
discern the effect of their actions on their rewards, and therefore would likely be unable to learn their
best routing strategies.
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we will elect to exclude certain node-time pairs from our estimate of the effect set of
(η, τ), even if we are sure that that are affected by ζ
η,τ
. This will be the case if we
expect that the changes in G due to varying ζ
η,τ
that are “mediated” through those
node-time pairs are relatively insignificant, and therefore effectively constitute noise for
the learning process, so that their effect on learnability is more important than their
effect on factoredness.
3.2 Model Description
To apply the COIN formalism to a network routing model, we must formally identify the
components of that model as deterministically evolving vectors ζ
,t
. In the model used
in this paper, at any time step all traffic at a router is a set of pairs of integer-valued
traffic amounts and associated ultimate destination tags. At each such time step t, each
router r sums the integer-valued components of its current traffic at that time step to
get its instantaneous load. We write that load as zr(t) ≡
∑
d xr,d(t), where the index
d runs over ultimate destinations, and xr,d(t) is the total traffic at time t going from r
towards d. After its instantaneous load at time t is evaluated, the router sends all its
traffic to the next downstream routers, in a manner governed by its routing algorithm.
We indicate such “next routers” by writing xr,d(t) =
∑
r′ xr,d,r′(t) where r
′ is the first
stop on the path to be followed from router r to ultimate destination d. After all such
routed traffic goes to those next downstream routers, the cycle repeats itself, until all
traffic reaches its destinations.
In our simulations, for simplicity, traffic was only introduced into the system (at
the source routers) at the beginning of successive waves of L consecutive time steps.
(L was always chosen to be the minimal number necessary for all traffic to reach its
destination before the next wave of traffic is initiated.) We use κ(t) to indicate either
the integer-valued wave number associated with time t or the set of all times in that
wave, as the context indicates.
In a real network, the cost of traversing a router does not change dramatically from
one packet to the next. To simulate this effect, we use time-averaged values of the load
at a router rather than instantaneous load to determine the cost a packet incurs in
traversing that router. More formally, we define the router’s windowed load, Zr(t),
as the running average of that router’s load value over a window of the previous W
timesteps: Zr(t) ≡
1
W
∑t
t′=t−W+1 zr(t
′) =
∑
d′ Xr,d′(t), where the value of Xr,d(t) is set
by the dynamical law Xr,d(t) =
1
W
∑t
t′=t−W+1 xr,d(t
′)). (W is always set to an integer
multiple of L.) For large enoughW , using such a window means that in a typical scenario
the costs across nodes will only change substantially over time scales significantly larger
than that of the individual routing decisions. The windowed load is the argument to a
load-to-cost function, V (·), which provides the cost accrued at time t by each packet
traversing the router at this timestep. That is, at time t, the cost for each packet to
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traverse router r is given by V (Zr(t)).
6 (We also introduce “dummy nodes” denoted by
V0(·) = 0 which help in translating the mathematics into the simulations. Omitting them
will have no effect on the simulations.) Different routers have different V (·), to reflect
the fact that real networks have differences in router software and hardware (response
time, queue length, processing speed etc). For simplicity, W is the same for all routers
however. With these definitions, world utility is given by
G(ζ) =
∑
t,r zr(t) Vr(Zr(t))
=
∑
t,r,d xr,d(t)Vr(Zr(t))
=
∑
t,r,d xr,d(t)Vr(
∑
d′ Xr,d′(t)) .
Our equation for G explicitly demonstrates that, as claimed above, in our represen-
tation we can expressG(ζ) as a sum of rewards,
∑
tRt(ζ ,t), whereR(ζ ,t) can be written as
function of a pair of (r, d)-indexed vectors: Rt(xr,d(t),Xr,d(t)) =
∑
r,d xr,d(t)Vr(
∑
d′ Xr,d′(t)).
Also as claimed, the Rt are temporal translations of one another.
Given this model, some of the components of ζ
,t
must be identified with the values
xr,d,r′(t) ∀ r, d, r
′ and t, since those are the actions we will take. Since all arguments
of G must be components of ζ, we also include the Xr,d(t) ∀r, d, t as components of
ζ
,t
. (We could use the {Zr(t)} as an alternative, but this would provide a “coarser”
WLU; see below.) Formally, for routing based on ML agents, other variables must also
be included in ζ, to capture the (deterministically evolving) internal parameters used
by those agents to make their routing decisions. We won’t have any need to explicitly
delineate such variables here however, and will mostly phrase the discussion as though
there were no such internal parameters.
Now the values {xr,d,r′(t−1)} ∀r, d, r
′ specify the values {xr,d(t)} ∀r, d directly. How-
ever the decisions of each router’s algorithm at all times t is a fixed function of the
{xr,d(t − 1)} and the {Zr(t − 1) =
∑
d′ Xr,d′(t − 1)}, a function given by the routing
algorithm which is implicitly encapsulated in the dynamical laws governing the sys-
tem. So in point of fact we can map the set of {xr,d,r′(t − 1)} ∀r, d, r
′ to the full set
{xr,d,r′(t)} ∀r, d, r
′, not just to {xr,d(t)}. Accordingly, the xr,d,r′ undergo deterministic
evolution. Since their values across time set all the values of the Xr,d(t) across time, we
see that the entire set of the components of ζ
,t
undergo deterministic evolution in this
representation, as required.
For evaluating the wonderful life utility we will need to group the components of ζ
,t
into disjoint nodes η. Here we will have two types of node, both types being indexed
by router-destination pairs. For each such node index (r, d), the first node type is the
variable Xr,d(t), and the second node type is the Euclidean vector with components
indexed by r′, (xr,d)r′(t). In setting “actions” we are concerned with setting the states
of the nodes of the second type. Accordingly, our learners will all be associated with
6Note that in our model, the costs are accrued at the routers, not the links. Also note that for
simplicity we do not physically instantiate the cost as a temporal delay in crossing a router.
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nodes of this second type. Unless explicitly indicated otherwise, from now on we will
implicitly have that second type of node in mind whenever we refer to a “node” or use
the symbol η.
At time step t, ISPA has access to all the windowed loads at time step t− 1 (i.e., it
has access to Zr(t − 1) ∀r), and assumes that those values will remain the same at all
times ≥ t. (Note that for large window sizes and times close to t, this assumption is
arbitrarily accurate.) Using this assumption, in ISPA, each router sends packets along
the path that it calculates will minimize the costs accumulated by its packets.
3.3 COIN Routing
Based on the COIN formalism presented in Section 3.1 and the model described above,
we now present the COIN-based routing algorithms.
To evaluate the WLU for a node (r, d) at any time τ , we must estimate the (primary
members of the) associated effect set. This means determining what components of ζ
,
will, under the dynamics of the system, be changed by altering any of the components
of the vector xr,d(τ).
As a first approximation, we will ignore effects that changing xr,d(τ) may have that
are “mediated” by the learning algorithms running in the system. That is, we ignore
changes that arise due to the the effects of changing xr,d(τ) on rewards, changes which
induce changes in future training sets, which then in turn get mapped to changes in
the {xr,d,r′(t)} (and therefore the {Xr,d(t)}) via the learning algorithms running on the
nodes.
As another approximation, we will ignore effects mediated by the routing algorithms’
observations of the state of the network. That is, we ignore changes in the {xr′′,d′,r′′′(t)}
that varying xr,d(τ) may cause due to (r
′′, d′)’s routing algorithm perceiving a different
state of the network and modifying its routing decisions accordingly. We only consider
the behavior of those routing algorithms that are (potentially) directly affected by xr,d(τ)
in that they (potentially) have to route packets that, at time τ , passed through r on the
way to d. So in particular we ignore effects of xr,d(τ) on the {xr′′,d′ 6=d,r′′′(t).
Since all packets routed in a wave arrive at their destinations by the end of the wave,
these approximations mean that the only xr′′,d′′,r′′′(t) that are in our estimate for xr,d(τ)’s
effect set have t in the same wave as τ . (These are the only ones that are, potentially,
directly affected by the {xr,d,r′(t)} by “chaining together” the sequence of xr′′,d′′,r′′′(t)
that get the packets in xr,d(t) to their ultimate destination.) Due to the wave nature of
our simulations though, the only xr′′,d′′,r′′′(t) within τ ’s wave that are affected by xr,d(τ)
all have d′′ = d. For reasons of coding simplicity, we do not concern ourselves whether
t < τ within a given wave and then exclude some xr′′,d′′,r′′′(t) accordingly. In other
words, all t within τ ’s wave are treated equally.
So one set of members of xr,d(τ)’s effect set is {xr′′,d,r′′′(t) ∀r
′′, d, r′′′, t ∈ κ(τ)}. Note
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that some of these members will be relatively unaffected by xr,d(τ) (e.g., those with r
′′
far in the net away from r). Again for simplicity, we do not try to determine these
and exclude them. As with keeping the xr′′,d,r′′′(t < τ), this inclusion of extra nodes
in our estimate of the effect set should hurt learnability, but in general should not hurt
factoredness. Therefore it should delay how quickly the learners determine their optimal
policies, but it won’t affect how the quality (for G) of those polices finally arrived at.
Note also that trying to determine whether some particular xr′′,d,r′′′(t ∈ κ(τ)) should be
included in xr,d(τ)’s effect set would mean, in part, determining whether packets routed
from (r, d) would have reached r′′ if (r, d) had made some routing decision different from
the one it actually made. This would be a non-trivial exercise, in general.
In contrast to the case with the xr′′,d′,r′′′(t), there are Xr′′,d′(t) with t in the future
of τ ’s wave that both are affected by xr,d(t) and also are not excluded by any of our
approximations so far. In particular, the Xr′′,d(t) with either r
′′ = r or r′′ one hop away
from r will be directly affected by xr,d(t), for t ∈ ∪
W−1
i=0 κ(τ + iL)) (cf. the definition
of the X variables). For simplicity, we restrict consideration of such Xr′′,d variables to
those with the same router as r, r′′ = r.
This final estimate for the effect set is clearly rather poor — presumably results better
than those presented below would accrue to use of a more accurate effect set. However
it’s worth bearing in mind that there is a “self-stabilizing” nature to the choice of effect
sets, when used in conjunction with effect set WLU’s. This nature is mediated by the
learning algorithms. If I take two nodes and give them the same utility function, then
the reward one node gets will be determined in part by what the other one does. So as
it modifies its behavior to try to increase its reward, that first node will be modifying
its behavior in a way dependent on what the other node does. In other words, if two
nodes are given the same WLU because they are estimated to be in each other’s effect
set, then ipso facto they will be in each other’s effect set.
Using our estimate for the effect set, the WLU for (η, τ) is given by the difference
between the total cost accrued in τ ’s wave by all nodes in the network and the cost
accrued by nodes when all nodes sharing η’s destination are “erased.” More precisely,
any node η that has a destination d will have the following effect set WLU’s, gη,τ :
gη,τ (ζ)= G(ζ)−G(CLCeff
(η,τ)
(ζ))
=
∑
t,r′,d′
xr′,d′(t) Vr′
(∑
d′
Xr′,d′(t)
)
−
∑
t,r′,d′
[
xr′,d′(t)(1 − I(t ∈ κ(τ))I(d
′ = d))
]
× Vr′
(∑
d′′
[ Xr′,d′′(t) (1− I(t ∈ ∪
W−1
i=0 κ(τ + iL))I(d
′′ = d)) ]
)
=
∑
t∈κ(τ)
∑
r′

∑
d′
xr′,d′(t) Vr′(
∑
d′′
Xr′,d′′(t)) −
∑
d′ 6=d
xr′,d′(t) Vr′(
∑
d′′ 6=d
Xr′,d′′(t))


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+
∑
t∈∪W−1i=1 κ(τ+iL)
∑
r′

∑
d′
xr′,d′(t) [Vr′(
∑
d′′
Xr′,d′′(t))− Vr′(
∑
d′′ 6=d
Xr′,d′′(t))]

 (7)
where I(.) is the indicator function that equals 1 if its argument is true, 0 otherwise.
To allow the learner to receive feedback concerning its actions in a wave immediately
following that wave rather than wait for ∼ WL time steps, we will approximate the
second sum in that last equality, the one over times following τ ’s wave, as zero. There
is another way we can view the resultant expression, rather than as an approximation
to the effect set WLU. That is to view it as the exact WLU of an approximation to the
effect set, an approximation which ignores effects on future windowed loads of clamping
a current traffic level. Regardless of what view we adopt, presumably better performance
could be achieved if we did not implement this approximation.
Given this approximation, our WLU becomes a wave-indexed time-translation-invariant
WL “reward function” (WLR):
gη,τ (ζ ,t∈κ(τ)) =
∑
t∈κ(τ),r′
(∑
d′
xr′,d′(t) Vr′(
∑
d′′
Xr′,d′′(t))
−
∑
d′ 6=d
xr′,d′(t) Vr′(
∑
d′′ 6=d
Xr′,d′′(t))

 . (8)
Notice that traffic going from a router r′ 6= r to a destination d′ 6= d affects the value of
the WLR for node (r, d). This reflects the fact that WLR takes into account side-effects
of (r, d)’s actions on other nodes. Note also that each r′-indexed term contributing to the
WLR can be computed by the associated router r′ separately, from information available
to that router. Subsequently those terms can be propagated through the network to η,
in much the same way as routing tables updates are propagated.
Given this choice of private utility, we must next specify how the COIN-based routing
algorithm collects the initial data that (in conjunction with this utility) is to be used to
guide the initial routing decisions that every node with more than one routing option
must make. In our experiments that data was collected during a preliminary running
of an ISPA. In this preliminary stage, the routing decisions are made using the ISPA,
but the resulting actions are “scored” using the WLR given by Equation 7. 7 The data
collected in this stage provides us with initial input-output training sets to be used by
the machine learning algorithm on each node: for each router-destination node, inputs
are identified with windowed loads on outgoing links, and the associated WLR values
for the destination in question are the outputs.
7We use the ISPA to generate the routing decisions in the initial data since it is likely in practice
that some kind of SPA will be the routing algorithm running prior to “turning on” the COIN algorithm.
Alternately one can generate the initial data’s routing decisions by having the routers make random
decisions, or by having them implement a sequence of decisions that “sweeps” across a grid through the
possible set of actions.
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After sufficient initial data is collected using the ISPA, the system switches to using
the COIN algorithm to make subsequent routing decisions. In this stage, each node
routes packets along the link that it estimates (based on the training set) would provide
the best WLR. To perform the estimation, the MB COIN makes use of a single-nearest-
neighbor algorithm as its learner. This algorithm simply guesses that the output that
would ensue from any candidate input is the same as the output of the element of
the training set that is the nearest neighbor (in input space) of that candidate input.8
In other words, the learner finds the training set input-output pair whose input value
(loads on outgoing links) is closest to that which would result from each potential routing
decision. Then the learner assigns the WLR associated with that training data pair as
the estimate for what WLR would result from said routing decision. These WLR values
are then used to choose among those potential routing decisions. The input-output data
generated under this algorithm is adding to the training set as it is generated.
In this routing algorithm, the routers only estimate how their routing decisions (as
reflected in their loads at individual time steps) will affect their WLR values (based on
many nodes’ loads). It is also possible to calculate exactly how the routing decisions affect
the routers’ WLR’s if, unlike the MB COIN, we had full knowledge of the loads of all
nodes in the system. In a way similar to ISPA, for each router we can evaluate the exact
WLR value that would ensue from each of its candidate actions, under the assumption
that windowed loads on all other routers are the same one wave into the future as they
are now. We call this algorithm for directly maximizing WLR (an algorithm we call the
full knowledge COIN (FK COIN)).
Note that under the assumption behind the FK COIN, the action η chooses in wave
κ(τ) that maximizes WLR will also maximize the world reward. In other words, WL
reward is perfectly factored with respect to (wave-indexed) world reward, even though
the associated utilities are not related that way (due to inaccuracy in our estimate of the
effect set). Due to this factoredness, the FK COIN is equivalent to load balancing on
world rewards. Since LB in general results in inferior performance compared to LB over
time, and since the FK COIN is equivalent to LB, one might expect that its performance
is suboptimal. Intuitively, this suboptimality reflects the fact that one should not choose
the action only with regard to its effect on current reward, but also with concern for the
reward of future waves. In the language of the COIN framework, this suboptimality can
be viewed as a restatement of the fact that for our inexactly estimated effect set, the
system will not be perfectly factored.
The learning algorithm of the MB COIN as described is extraordinarily crude. In
addition, the associated scheme for choosing an action is purely exploitative, with no
exploration whatsoever. Rather than choose some particular more sophisticated scheme
and tune it to fit our simulations, we emulated using more sophisticated algorithms in
8This is a very simple learning algorithm, and we use it here only to demonstrate the potential
practical feasibility of a COIN-based routing algorithm. The performance can presumably be improved
if more sophisticated learning algorithms (e.g., Q-learning [23, 24]) are used.
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general. We did this by modifying the MB COIN algorithm to occasionally have the FK
COIN determine a router’s action rather than the purely greedy learner outlined above.
The steering parameter discussed in Section 4.5 determines how often the routing
decision is based on the MB COIN as opposed to the FK COIN.
4 SIMULATION RESULTS
Based on the model and routing algorithms discussed above, we have performed simula-
tions to compare the performance of ISPA and MB COIN across a variety of networks,
varying in size from five to eighteen nodes. In all cases traffic was inserted into the
network in a regular, non-stochastic manner at the sources. The results we report are
averaged over 20 runs. We do not report error bars as they are all lower than 0.05.
In Sections 4.1 - 4.4 we analyze traffic patterns over four networks where ISPA suffers
from the Braess’ paradox. In contrast, the MB COIN almost never falls prey to the
paradox for those networks (or for no networks we have investigated is the MB COIN
significantly susceptible to Braess’ paradox). Then in Section 4.5 we discuss the ef-
fect on the MB COIN’s performance of the “steering” parameter which determines the
intelligence of the MB COIN.9
4.1 Bootes Network
The first network type we investigate is shown in Figure 3. It is in many senses a trivial
network. (Indeed, in Net A, the sources do not even have any choices to make.) The
loads introduced at the sources do not change in time and are listed in Tables 1 and 2,
along with the performances of our algorithms.
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Figure 3: Bootes Network
The MB COIN results are identical to the ISPA results in the absence of the additional
link (Network A). However, Braess’ paradox arises with ISPA, in that the addition of the
9In Sections 4.1 - 4.4, the steering parameter is set at 0.5.
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Table 1: Average Per Packet Cost for BOOTES2 networks for V1 = 10 + log(1 +
x) ; V2 = 4x
2 ; V3 = log(1 + x) .
Loads at (S1, S2) Net ISPA MB COIN
1,1 A 6.35 6.35
B 8.35 5.93
2,1 A 8.07 8.07
B 10.40 7.88
2,2 A 9.55 9.55
B 10.88 9.71
4,2 A 10.41 10.41
B 11.55 10.41
Table 2: Average Per Packet Cost for BOOTES4 network for V1 = 50+log(1+x) ; V2 =
10x ; V3 = log(1 + x) .
Loads at (S1, S2) Net ISPA MB COIN
1,1 A 30.35 30.35
B 20.35 20.35
2,2 A 35.55 35.55
B 40.55 34.99
4,2 A 41.07 41.07
B 50.47 44.13
6,3 A 44.63 44.63
B 51.40 44.63
new link in network B degrades the performance of the ISPA in six of the eight traffic
regimes and load-to-cost functions investigated. The MB COIN on the other hand is
only hurt by the addition of the new link once, and manages to gainfully exploit it
seven times. (When behavior is analyzed infinitesimally, the MB COIN either uses the
additional link efficiently or chooses to ignore it in those seven cases.) Moreover, the
MB COIN’s performance with the additional link is always better than the ISPA’s. For
example, adding the new link causes a degradation of the performance by as much as 30
% (loads = {2, 1}) for the ISPA, whereas for the same load vector MB COIN performance
improves by 7 %.
4.2 Hex Network
In this section we revisit the network first discussed in Section 2.1 (redrawn in Figure 4 to
include the dummy nodes). In Table 3 we give full results for the load-to-delay functions
discussed in that section. We then use load-to-cost functions which are qualitatively
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similar to those discussed in Section 2.1, but which incorporate non-linearities that better
represent real router characteristics. That load-to-cost function and associated results
are reported in Table 4.
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Figure 4: Hex network
This network demonstrates that while the addition of a new link may be beneficial
in low traffic cases, it leads to bottlenecks in higher traffic regimes. For ISPA although
the per packet cost for loads of 1 and 2 drop drastically when the new link is added,
the per packet cost increases for higher loads. The MB COIN on the other hand uses
the new link efficiently. Notice that the MB COIN’s performance is slightly worse than
that of the ISPA in the absence of the additional link. This is caused by the MB COIN
having to use a learner to estimate the WLU values for potential actions whereas the
ISPA simply has direct access to all the information it needs (costs at each link).
Table 3: Average Per Packet Cost for HEX network for V1 = 50 + x ; V2 = 10x ; V3 =
10 + x .
Load Net ISPA MB COIN
1 A 55.50 55.56
B 31.00 31.00
2 A 61.00 61.10
B 52.00 51.69
3 A 66.50 66.65
B 73.00 64.45
4 A 72.00 72.25
B 87.37 73.41
4.3 Butterfly Network
The next network we investigate is shown in Figure 5. It is an extension to the simple
network discussed in Section 4.1. We now have doubled the size of the network and have
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Table 4: Average Per Packet Cost for HEX network for V1 = 50 + log(1 + x) ; V2 =
10x ; V3 = log(1 + x) .
Load Net ISPA MB COIN
1 A 55.41 55.44
B 20.69 20.69
2 A 60.69 60.80
B 41.10 41.10
3 A 65.92 66.10
B 61.39 59.19
4 A 71.10 71.41
B 81.61 69.88
three sources that have to route their packets to two destinations (packets originating at
S1 go to D1, and packets originating at S2 or S3 go to D2). Initially the two halves of the
network have minimal contact, but with the addition of the extra link two sources from
the two two halves of the network share a common router on their potential shortest
path.
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Figure 5: Butterfly Network
Table 5 presents two sets of results: first we present results for uniform traffic through
all three sources, and then results for asymmetric traffic. For the first case, the Braess’
paradox is apparent in the ISPA: adding the new link is beneficial for the network at low
load levels where the average per packet cost is reduced by nearly 20%, but deleterious
at higher levels. The MB COIN, on the other hand, provides the benefits of the added
link for the low traffic levels, without suffering from deleterious effects at higher load
levels.
For the asymmetric traffic patterns, the added link causes a drop in performance for
the ISPA, especially for low overall traffic levels. This is not true for the MB COIN.
Notice also that in the high, asymmetric traffic regime, the ISPA performs significantly
worse than the MB COIN even without the added link, showing that a bottleneck occurs
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Table 5: Average Per Packet Cost for BUTTERFLY network for V1 = 50 + log(1 +
x) ; V2 = 10x ; V3 = log(1 + x).
Loads (S1, S2, S3) Net ISPA MB COIN
1,1,1 A 112.1 112.7
B 92.1 92.3
2,2,2 A 123.3 124.0
B 133.3 122.5
4,4,4 A 144.8 142.6
B 156.5 142.3
3,2,1 A 81.8 82.5
B 99.5 81.0
6,4,2 A 96.0 94.1
B 105.3 94.0
9,6,3 A 105.5 98.2
B 106.7 98.8
on the right side of network alone (similar to the Braess’ paradox observed in Section 4.1).
4.4 Ray Network
In all the networks and traffic regimes discussed so far the sources are the only routers
with more than one routing option. The final network we investigate is a larger network
where the number of routers with multiply options is significantly higher than in the
previous networks. Figure 6 shows the initial network (Net A) and the “augmented”
network (Net B), where new links have been added. The original network has relatively
few choices for the routers, as packets are directed toward their destinations along “con-
duits.” The new links are added in the augmented networks to provide new choices
(crossing patterns) that could be beneficial if certain of the original conduits experience
large costs.
Table 6 shows the simulation results for these networks (S1 and S2 send packets to D1
and D2 respectively). At low load levels both the ISPA and the MB COIN use the new
links effectively, although the MB COIN performs slightly worse. This is mainly caused
by the difficulty encountered by the simple learner (single nearest neighbor algorithm)
in quickly learning the traffic patterns in this large network. Unlike the ISPA however,
the MB COIN avoids the Braess’ paradox in all cases except the very high traffic regime.
Moreover, even there, the effect is significantly milder than that encountered by the
ISPA.
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Figure 6: Ray network
Table 6: Average Per Packet Cost for RAY network for V1 = 50 + log(1 + x) ; V2 =
10x ; V3 = 10 + log(1 + x).
Loads at S1andS2) Net ISPA MB COIN
2,2 A 143.6 143.7
B 124.4 126.9
3,3 A 154.6 154.9
B 165.5 151.0
4,4 A 165.4 166.0
B 197.7 165.6
6,6 A 186.7 187.4
B 205.1 191.6
4.5 Steering the MB COIN
The final aspect of COIN-based routing we investigate is the impact of the choice for the
value of the steering parameter. This parameter both controls the amount of exploration
the algorithm performs and determines the “intelligence” of the MB COIN at estimating
the surface directly calculated by the FK COIN. In Figure 7 we provide results when
the steering parameter is set to 1.0 so that the MB COIN reduces to FK COIN. This
provides an upper bound on the performance that the MB COIN could achieve if it used
no exploration.
For the HEX network (Figure 7(a)), the performance at the worst setting for the
MB COIN, which corresponds to no steering, is comparable to ISPA. In contrast, with
moderate steering (0.5) the results are similar to that of the FK COIN, as the learner
has more information to work with (arising from the extra parts of the input space
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Figure 7: Impact of switching.
represented in the training set due to the occasional use of the FK COIN), it bridges
the gap between a suboptimal algorithm susceptible to Braess’ paradox and one which
efficiently avoids that paradox.
For the RAY network (Figure 7(b)), the value of the steering parameter is more
critical. With no steering at all, the MB COIN performs poorly in this network — even
worse than ISPA. This is not surprising in that because there are many routing choices
that affect the performance, the simple memory-based learner needs proper “seeding” to
be able to perform well. In any case, with the addition of steering the MB COIN quickly
outperforms the ISPA.
Finally, for both the Butterfly and Bootes networks (Figures 7(c) - 7(d)) the MB
COIN needs very little steering to perform well. Although for the Butterfly network the
performance of MB COIN improves slightly with more information, it is significantly
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better than the ISPA across the board.
5 CONCLUSION
Effective routing in a network is a fundamental problem in many fields, including data
communications and transportation. Shortest path algorithms provide an elegant so-
lution to this problem, but under certain circumstances suffer from less than desirable
effects. One such effect is Braess’ paradox, where increased capacity results in lower over-
all throughput for shortest path algorithms due to the potentially harmful side-effects of
the decisions made by such algorithms. Even a full-blown load-balancing can suffer from
such side-effects , since in general they extend across time as well as space, whereas, load
balancing ignores temporal side-effects.
Collective Intelligence is a novel way of controlling distributed systems so as to avoid
the deleterious side-effects. In a COIN, the central issue is in determining the personal
objectives to be assigned to the components of the system. One wants to choose those
goals so that the greedy pursuit of those goals by the components of the system leads to
a globally desirable solution. We have summarized COIN theory and derived a routing
algorithm based on that theory. In our simulations, the ISPA induced average costs
as much as 32 % higher than the COIN-based algorithm. This was despite the ISPA’s
having access to more information than the MB COIN. Furthermore the COIN-based
algorithm avoided the Braess’ paradoxes that seriously diminished the performance of
the ISPA.
In the work presented here, the COIN-based algorithm had to overcome severe limi-
tations. Firstly, the estimation of the effect sets used were exceedingly poor. Secondly,
the learners were particularly simple-minded, and therefore were not able to effectively
maximize their performance. That a COIN-based router with such serious limitations
consistently outperformed an ideal shortest path algorithm demonstrates the strength of
the proposed method.
We are currently investigating novel utilities that are more “learnable” for the routers
as well as expand the simulations to larger networks using a commercial event driven
simulator. Future work will focus on not making the approximation that current traffic
levels do not affect future windowed loads (Equation 7). It will also involve investigating
better estimates of effect sets, in particular not including all nodes with the same desti-
nation in one’s effect set, and more generally using a more ”fine-grained” representation
of the nodes, for example including each packet’s originating source, to allow a more
fine-grained effect set (and resultant WLU).
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